Court Ordered Counselling

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Under section 224 of the Family Law Act, the courts have power to require parties attend counselling. This can be in the form of family dispute resolution or individual counselling. The courts can even order a child attend counselling without their guardians’ consent. This broad power of the court must be exercised in a manner that best respects the interests of the child. Counselling for children can be extremely beneficial, especially in situations of high family conflict or violence. Recognizing this, the Family Law Act also authorizes the courts to allocate the cost of counselling or other related services between the litigation parties, or to require only one party pay.

Particularly for young children who are more vulnerable to potential alienation from a parent, the court may order counselling. In C.H.T. v. P.V.L., 2015 BCSC 419, two children, aged 10 and 13, were estranged from their father. The court held that the objective should be that the children repair and reintegrate their relationship with their father, and that both parents must also follow the counsellor’s recommendations.

The age of the children and their expressed wishes will be taken into account when the court makes a decision regarding ordering counselling. In M.Y.T.C. v. L.H.N., 2018 BCSC 1174, the parties’ 15-year-old son was estranged from his mother. The son had clearly expressed that he did not want to go to counselling, and would meet any efforts to force him to go with resistance. The court held that ordering him into counselling would only further damage the relationship with his mother.

We understand how challenging it can be to navigate emotionally charged family matters. Our lawyers strive to resolve issues with minimal toll to clients.

If you have any questions, please call Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

 

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Orders to Restrain a Spouse from Disposing of Family Property

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If a party to a separation has concerns that their ex-spouse might dispose of family property, or deal with it in a way which adversely affects their interests, a section 91 order may help. The Family Law Act requires that, on application by a spouse, the Supreme Court make an order restraining the other spouse from disposing of any property at issue. These orders are often made mutually, such that both spouses are restrained from deposing of property, pending a resolution of the matters.

This type of order is a form of interim relief, and can only be applied for by a party who has standing under the FLA. To have standing, the party must be married, divorced, separated, or have lived with their ex in a marriage-like relationship of over two years.

Situations in which it may be beneficial to apply for a section 91 order include:
• A spouse refuses to communicate regarding assets;
• A spouse is likely to declare bankruptcy;
• A spouse making attempts to transfer or sell assets; or
• A spouse using substantial amounts of a line of credit.

Finally, applications for section 91 orders can be made prior to having to attend a Judicial Case Conference, which is very beneficial considering the lengthy wait times to be able to attend a JCC.
For more information regarding family law and property matters, please call Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

 

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What Factors Contribute to a Successful Will Variation Claim?

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While will-makers have flexibility regarding how they dispose of their assets upon death, if they fail to adequately provide for a surviving spouse or child, their will may be varied by the Court. Section 60 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act of British Columbia authorizes a court to order compensation that it finds adequate, just, and equitable, out of the will-maker’s estate. Only spouses and children of the testator may seek a variation and must commence an action within 180 days from the Grant of Probate. Spouses include common-law partners, with whom the will-maker was in a marriage-like relationship for at least two years. Case law has excluded stepchildren not adopted by the will-maker and birth-children adopted by third parties from being proper applicants of a will variation claim.

The seminal case regarding wills variation is Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807 (“Tataryn”), where the Court held that a will-maker must meet both their legal and moral obligations to surviving children and spouses. The legal obligations are those which would have been imposed if property division and support were considered during the will-maker’s lifetime. Moral obligations represent society’s reasonable expectations of what should be done in the circumstances and are linked to community standards. While the Court in Clucas v. Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, 1999 CanLII 5519 (BC SC) held the will-maker’s autonomy should only be interfered with to the extent statute requires, there are some factors which often lead to variation, even in the situation of adult children who are financially independent.

The standard of living which the will-maker allowed a Plaintiff to become accustomed to will influence their level of moral obligation. In Wilson v. Lougheed, 2010 BCSC 1868, the Court considered the large size of the estate (nearly $20 million), the daughter’s current financial circumstances, and how the will-maker had historically treated her very generously when deciding to vary the will. While there is a general principle that Plaintiffs should continue to be maintained in a manner which they’ve become accustomed to, it is balanced against the estate’s ability to meet competing claims. Adult children who have financially contributed to their parents’ estates, but who are then not adequately provided for in the will are often successful under wills variations claims. This was seen in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 2000 BCCA 491, where the Court varied a mother’s will in favor of the daughter who’d made contributions to the financial purchase and running of the mother’s house. The years which the daughter had cohabitated with her mother, and the mother’s promise that the daughter would inherit the house portion of the estate also had weight in court.

The case law regarding when will-makers can limit or disinherit is ever-evolving and hinges around many factors. Will-makers’ wishes to limit inheritance may come into conflict with the moral obligations set out in Tataryn, specifically when a will-maker’s reasons might not be sufficient under community standards of what a judicious parent would have done. This was seen in Lamperstorfer v. Lamperstorfer Estate, 2018 BCSC 89, where the Court held that the will-maker’s mental health challenges and reclusiveness from society prevented him from meeting his moral obligation to his sons. Absent reasons otherwise, there’s an expectation that adult children will share equally in their parents’ estate, as seen in Laing v. Jarvis Estate, 2011 BCSC 1082. Yet reasons can be various, and the Court is hesitant to interfere with a will-maker’s wishes so long as they were made with a sound mind. In particular, Williams v. Williams Estate, 2018 BCSC 711, where a father arranged his affairs to leave all but approximately $5,000 of his estate to his favorite son, Brent, to the detriment of the other son, Ron. The will-maker had a much stronger relationship with Brent, and Brent also had dependants to support. Further, the will-maker had entirely lost contact with Ron for several years. Despite how the prevailing son Brent was financially stable before his father’s passing, and how the financial outcome was unequal, the Court refused to vary the will.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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What Happens if the City/Municipality Decides to Expropriate Land?

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Local governments, such as the City of Nanaimo, are empowered by section 31 of the Community Charter to expropriate land. Section 289 of the Local Government Act gives the same power to regional districts. Expropriation is the taking of land without the owner’s consent and is an exceptional power which isn’t often exercised. The Expropriation Act must be adhered to by the local government and covers procedural requirements to be taken, as well as compensation for the land itself and disturbance caused to the landowner. Local governments can expropriate in order to provide services for the benefit of all or part of the community or in order to provide any services which are considered necessary or desirable.

In 2011 Nanaimo City Council adopted bylaw no. 7130 to expropriate land along Bowen Road. The purpose was to improve the public road and to carry out the replacement of the Quarterway Bridge. The city was unable to acquire the land through negotiation, although negotiation is the preferred option. Local governments secure certainty of costs if able to negotiate a set purchase price, while under expropriation, expenses and damages to be paid to the landowner are much less certain. Local governments are statutorily obligated to pay the market value of the property plus reasonable damages for the disturbance caused by the expropriation – amounts that are challenging to predict.

After a decision to expropriate, the local government will need to physically inspect the land, as certain issues can affect the value of the property. Under section 6 of the Expropriation Act, notice of intent to expropriate the land must be given to the owner, as well as posted on the land itself. Section 32 of the Community Charter provides authority for a local government to enter and inspect the land. Section 290 of the Local Government Act provides the same power for a regional district to enter and inspect, as does section 9 of the Expropriation Act. Consent of the owner is not necessary, but the local government is responsible for paying any compensation related to loss or damage caused by entrance and/or inspection. In compliance with the Expropriation Act, the local government will conduct an appraisal of the market value of the land which would have been obtained had the owner sold under normal circumstances. Reasonable compensation to be paid to the owner must also be calculated, covering factors such as moving expenses, legal expenses, and potentially increased mortgage rates for the owner’s subsequent property purchase.

 

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Trademark Infringement and The Tort of Passing Off

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In Royal Pacific Real Estate Group Ltd. v. Dong, 2020 BCCA 323, the British Columbia Court of Appeal made it clear that unauthorized use of a trademark carries legal consequences. The Court found that the Defendant, Mr. Dong, had committed the tort of passing off, despite his arguments that he had proper consent from the Plaintiff, Royal Pacific Real Estate Group Ltd., to use the Royal Pacific trademark. Mr. Dong had signed an agreement with the Plaintiff whereby he would work under the real estate group as an independently contracted real estate representative. The agreement allowed and even encouraged Mr. Dong to use the Royal Pacific trademark in this capacity, because the group is well-known for success in the Vancouver area, having arranged billions of dollars of sales. But Mr. Dong could only properly use the trademark for his work under the real estate group; he was not authorized to use the trademark for his other private businesses. One of these included his business named Bliip Box, which he’d hoped to have as a supplier of real estate websites.

Mr. Dong took several actions which constituted trademark infringement including making available the contact information of the Royal Pacific group on his personal website, such that the public would consider Royal Pacific to be endorsing or associated with Mr. Dong’s personal site. The Defendant also sent solicitation emails to various real estate agents, saying that Royal Pacific was seeking to endorse local businesses through his personal Bliip Box company, while Royal Pacific had no intent of this. Even after Royal Pacific lawfully terminated their agreement with the Defendant, and as such he no longer had authority to use the trademark whatsoever, he continued to do so. Bliip Box continued to display Royal Pacific’s trademark, and in launching this business relied on the Royal Pacific online domain name. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgement that Mr. Dong had committed the tort of passing off outlined under section 7 of the Trademark Act. The Court recognized that the three elements of passing off were present, being: The existence of reputation or goodwill, a misrepresentation leading the public to believe an association between the parties, and damage or potential damage to the Plaintiff, as outlined in Vancouver Community College v. Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc., 2017 BCCA 41.

The goodwill associated with familiar trademarks has commercial value, and companies such as Royal Pacific will not stand silent in the face of passing off. The Defendant passing off his goods and services as being endorsed by and associated with the trademarked name can be viewed as the unauthorized use of goodwill, and wrongful confusion of the public. While the trial judge only awarded nominal damages of $6,000 to the Plaintiff, an injunction restraining Mr. Dong from continued trademark infringement was also granted. The Court held that the Plaintiffs underwent considerable inconvenience, but that Mr. Dong hadn’t financially benefited from his conduct.

 

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Minority Shareholder Oppression Rights In British Columbia

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In the recent case of Canex Investment Corporation v. 0799701 B.C. Ltd., 2020 BCCA 231, the British Columbia Court of Appeal showed its flexibility in offering oppression remedies for wronged minority shareholders. The case involved exceptionally high-handed conduct by the two directors of Canex Investment Corporation (“Canex”), leading to their personal financial gain at the expense of the minority shareholder Plaintiffs. Neither Canex nor its minority shareholders benefited from the $500,000 loan taken out and secured by Canex’s properties, rather, the loan was used to finance a related company (Flame Engineering & Construction) controlled by the Defendants. Further, the Defendants falsified financial records related to the Flame Engineering loan, manipulated Canex’s records to reduce the Plaintiffs’ investment through charging excessively high interest and management fees, and advanced arguments which Justice Harris termed as “bogus”.

Section 227 of the Business Corporations Act allows shareholders to apply for remedies when they’ve suffered harm that is typically, but not necessarily, separate from the harm suffered by the corporation as a whole. The remedy granted in this case was the return of the minority shareholders’ initial investment plus interest. In addition, the Court of Appeal found that punitive damages of $100,000 were appropriate, considering the egregious conduct of the Defendants. While the Defendants tried to assert that a derivative rather than an oppression action ought to have been brought by the shareholders, meaning that the Plaintiffs would have additional hurdles in order to obtain financial relief, the Court held that the oppression action was supported. Typically, if harm has been done to the company itself, a derivative action is appropriate. Oppression actions are brought when harm has been done to individual shareholders. But the Court held that the remedy of oppression will not be limited by mere corporate structure, and that the substantive reality of how a company is operated, instead of the legal from, is what matters.

On appeal, the Defendants argued that the trial judge had failed to recognize the formalities of corporate governance when imposing personal liability on the Defendants as directors. But based on the Defendants’ wrongful conduct and taking financial advantage, personal liability had to be imposed despite the separate legal personality of Canex as a corporation. Further, one of the Defendant’s personal liability survived beyond her declaration of bankruptcy because the fraud was committed while acting in a fiduciary capacity. While directors typically only owe fiduciary duties to a company itself rather than individual shareholders, the Court recognized the reality of this closely held corporation. Here, the two shareholders were in a special relationship of trust and dependency with the directors; the directors were expected to manage the company’s financial records honestly and in good faith, yet breached those duties. The Court brought home its disapproval of the Defendant’s oppressive conduct by imposing punitive damages. These types of damages are appropriate when conduct is so high-handed or malicious that it offends the Court’s sense of dignity. Particularly relevant for closely held corporations such as Canex, this case highlights the Court’s willingness to offer expanded remedies to minority shareholders based on the substantive conduct that occurred, and to turn down arguments based on technical corporate structure.

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Is a Strata Corporation Able to Disallow Residents Under a Certain Age?

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Strata corporations (“stratas”) are legal entities with all the powers of natural persons at full capacity. They’re often created to divide buildings and/or parcels of land into individually owned pieces, while the common land and amenities are owned together. Stratas have certain responsibilities under the Strata Property Act and Regulations, including being responsible for common expenses and disclosing Rules and Bylaws which apply to occupiers. Stratas also have the power to provide Bylaws for the management and use of the lots, including prohibiting occupants under certain ages.

Age is not a protected ground of discrimination under the Human Rights Code in the context of property purchases, but race and gender, among other factors, are included. Stratas have the power to disallow would-be owners who are not of a certain age. The Human Rights Code gives broader protection covering age-based discrimination to tenants, as opposed to owners. Stratas may only require that tenants be at least 55 years of age. They cannot require, for example, that tenants be at least 19 years of age, but the strata could require that owners be at least 19 years of age. Individuals who resided within the strata before the time that an age restriction bylaw was passed are considered ‘grandfathered’ in and may continue residing despite the new provision.

Age-based requirements can occasionally make it challenging for young families to find housing for purchase, but the Condominium Homeowners Association of BC reported that buildings with 19-plus age restrictions represented only a small portion of the overall market. Affordable and accessible housing is a developing area and age-based provisions may undergo further legislative reform in the future.

 

 

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Hidden Tendering Terms

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In Triton Hardware Limited v. Torngat Regional Housing Association, 2020 NLSC 72, the owners of a construction project (“Torngat”) sought to rely on a privilege clause in the project’s tendering documents to select its preferred bidder, not the lowest bidder. This case serves as a cautionary tale to owners that a general privilege clause does not afford them absolute discretion.

In the case, the plaintiff (“Triton”) made a material supplier bid to Torngat for the construction of a housing project. Triton’s bid was the lowest. Yet, Torngat selected another bidder with whom it had previously worked and preferred. In making this preferential selection, Triton relied on the following clause: The awarding of the contract will be based on the lowest average price for quality material. *The Lowest of Any Quotes Will Not necessarily Be Accepted.

At trial, Knickle J. interpreted the impugned privilege clause as allowing the owner to either select the lowest bidder or to select no bidder at all. The asterisk-qualification did not permit the owner to select from any of the bidders according to undisclosed criteria (para. 63). As a result, Triton was awarded $126,852.14 for its lost profits.

If general privilege causes were not read strictly but, instead, granted owners complete discretion when selecting bidders, the tendering process would be rendered meaningless. As the Supreme Court of Canada established in Martel Building Ltd., v. R., 2000 SCC 60, the tendering process must treat all bidders fairly and equally.

As such, there must be reasonable certainty regarding the terms of selection. If otherwise, all bidders would be prejudiced. That is, the losing bidders would expend resources in producing a hopeless tender, and the winning bidder’s tender would be arbitrarily reduced by fictional market competition.

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Signing a Will in British Columbia by Video Conference

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Due to COVID-19, the Wills, Estates, Succession Act of BC (WESA) was amended in August 2020 to permit a Will-maker to sign a Will in the electronic presence of witnesses and the Will-maker and witnesses to sign by electronic signature.

Section 35.1 of WESA defines “electronic presence” or “electronically present” to mean the circumstances in which two or more persons in different locations communicate simultaneously to an extent that is similar to communication that would occur if all the persons were physically present in the same location. We believe this means that the Will-maker and the witnesses may sign by way of videoconference.

When witnessing a Will by videoconference, each of the Will-maker and the two witnesses must sign an identical Will, and those two (or three, if none of them are in the same place) documents compiled together form the Will. As a result, the Will could be two or three times as long because slipping in signature pages is not permitted. A copy of a Will is considered identical even if there are minor, non-material differences in the format between the copies.

We recommend that a Will signed electronically include a statement that the Will was signed in counterpart in the electronic presence of two witnesses while connected by Audio and Video Conference.

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Engineers’ Liability

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Engineers have specialized skill and knowledge on which their clients rely. When engineers are found to be professionally negligent, this relationship of reliance limits an engineer’s ability to shield themselves from liability by operating their business as a corporation. To consider why this is the case, we review several key decisions that create a duty of care between engineers and their firm’s clients.

Employee’s Liability

In London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., 1992 CanLII 41 (SCC), the Supreme Court of Canada found that employees of a company, who performed the services for which their company has been hired to complete, may owe a duty of care to the company’s customer. That is, the individual employee may be liable for any damages arising from services they negligently perform on behalf of their employer. In the case, warehouse workers were found to have negligently handled the Plaintiff’s machinery resulting in significant damages. Because the Plaintiff’s contract with the Warehouse owner contained a limitation of liability clause which restricted recovery to $40, the Plaintiff sued the owner’s employees personally. The Supreme Court of Canada found that, although the employees owed a duty of care to the owner’s customers, the contract’s limitation of liability clause logically extended to the Owner’s employees, for they were the ones performing all of the contract’s enumerated tasks.

In the construction context, this principle of an employee’s liability arose in Edgeworth Construction Ltd. v. N.D. Lea & Associates Ltd., 1993 CanLII 67 (SCC). In the case, Edgeworth, the plaintiff company, was the successful tenderer on a provincial highway contract. Edgeworth claimed that it lost money on the project due to errors in the specifications and construction drawings prepared by the defendant engineers, N. D. Lea. Consequently, Edgeworth sued N.D. Lea and its individual engineers for negligent misrepresentation.

While the Supreme Court of Canada found that N.D. Lea was liable for negligent misrepresentation, it held that the firm’s individual engineers were not liable because they only affixed their professional seals to the impugned designs. Therefore, the Court found that the tenderers in the bidding process did not rely on any individual engineer’s representations because the seal merely represented that the designs were prepared by a qualified engineer, not that the designs were accurate. Since no representations were made by an individual engineer, there was no basis for finding that the engineers had a duty of care to the tenderers (viz. Edgeworth).

The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the Edgeworth decision in British Columbia v. R.B.O. Architecture Inc., 1994 CanLII 1740 (BC CA) and in Boss Developments Ltd. v. Quality Air Maintenance Ltd., 1995 CanLII 3213 (BC CA). In Boss, Gibbs J.A. distinguished the case from Edgeworth on the grounds that the engineer did more than simply affix their seal to a design. Instead, the engineer signed a report indicating that an aircraft was properly maintained when it was not. Despite the fact that the engineer’s employer had the inspection contract with the customer, the engineer was found personally liable. Gibbs J.A. justified his finding by writing: “only an individual can be qualified as an aircraft maintenance engineer in this field of special skill and knowledge, … it is the individual mechanic who certifies [and] whose skill is being relied upon.”

Boss was applied and extended to a firm’s engineering employees generally in Maritime Steel and Founderies Ltd. v. Whitman Benn and Associates Ltd., 1996 CanLII 5415 (NS SC) and Strata Plan No. VR 1720 (Owners) v. Bart Developments Ltd., 1999 CanLII 5428 (BC SC). In both cases, the engineers did not simply attach their seals to tendering materials –as in Edgeworth—but rather, they provided negligent services to the plaintiffs directly.

Concerning an engineer’s personal liability, Edwards, J. wrote in Bart:
It cannot be plausibly argued that a limited company purporting to offer professional services of “consulting engineers” and indicating that its employees have special skill and experience is not inducing its clients to rely on those individuals’ expertise. It is immaterial whether the client can identify that expertise with individual employees of the firm.
In other words, engineering firms cannot perform engineering services without qualified employees. As such, the firm’s employees must know that their specialized skill and knowledge is being relied upon by the customer, and therefore, they owe a duty of care to their firm’s customers generally.

In conclusion, individual engineers working for an incorporated engineering firm are not shielded from liability by virtue of their employer’s corporate structure. Likewise, engineering firms may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employed engineer.

To limit their liability, engineers have four options:

First, they may contractually limit their liability for damages, e.g. to the amount of fees paid. Second, they may place disclaimers on their designs to prevent other parties from unreasonably relying on them. Third, engineers can increase their professional liability insurance coverage. And fourth, engineers can supervise the construction process to ensure their designs are properly constructed.

 

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