Providing financial disclosure in the course of a Family Law dispute can be overwhelming. This post is meant to be a brief guide on how and why you should complete the Form F8 Financial Statement (“F8”), and to address some common questions.

What is the F8?

The F8 requires you to be open and honest about your finances so that each party in a family law dispute, your lawyers, and the Court may know the starting point for negotiations and orders.

The F8 is a sworn document, meaning that being dishonest in completing it has the same consequences as lying under oath. Carelessness and inaccuracies in the F8 will reflect poorly on your credibility and may result in unfavorable treatment by the Courts. Many of the main issues in a family law dispute revolve around financial support and division of property, so a complete and accurate F8 is integral to resolving your dispute in an efficient, fair, and cost-effective manner.

Timelines:

The Supreme Court Family Rules require each party to exchange an F8 and supporting financial documents within 30 days of either commencing a Family Law action (for the Claimant) or from being served with a Notice of Family Claim (for the Respondent).

Structure:

The F8 is divided into six parts:

1) Part 1: Income
2) Part 2: Expenses
3) Part 3: Property
4) Part 4: Special or Extraordinary Expenses
5) Part 5: Undue Hardship
6) Part 6: Income of Other Persons in Household

Page 2 of the F8 indicates which parts to complete based upon the claims that are being made. It is important to refer to your financial documents while completing the F8. Categories like expenses and income may be difficult to ascertain, but it is important that you do not guess based on what you think your finances might be.

General Tips for Completing the F8:

Income for Those who are Self-Employed:

Arriving at your net income amount may be difficult. Some expenses, such as gas, cell phone, meals with clients, and a portion of your utilities or mortgage may be expenses that should be deducted from your gross income but not listed in Part 2 of the F8. You may wish to consult with your lawyer and accountant in completing this section.

Expenses:

Record what you actually spend. The relevant information is not what you would like to spend, or how much you used to spend before the separation. Put in your current expenses without embellishing.

If you share household expenses with another person, for instance, if you have remarried, are living with a new partner, or have a roommate, do not list the total combined amount; only record your share of the household expenses that you actually pay.

Periodic expenses should be divided to arrive at your monthly amount. If you pay some expenses annually or biannually, such as car insurance or property taxes, divide the total by 12 or 6 to come to the monthly amount.

Record expenses incurred or reasonably anticipated for the year. Some expenses, such as re-roofing or tree trimming, happen less often than once a year. If the expense arose this year, include it in the F8. If you re-roofed your home last year, then do not use that expense as an estimate of this year’s house maintenance costs, because it will not be repeated this year.

Property:

List all of the assets that you own, either solely or jointly with someone else (identify the co-owner of the property and the extent of their interest). Include assets that your spouse will not make a claim against, those that are located outside of Canada, those that you have acquired since the date of separation and those that your spouse does not know about.

You must list all of the assets that you have disposed of, including by sale or by gift, in the 2 years preceding the application. This includes assets that you owned independently of your spouse, dispositions that your spouse consented to, and assets that your spouse did not know about.

Debts should be listed in this section. A mortgage is considered a debt, and loans from friends or family should be included as well.

Changes in Circumstances:

The F8 is mostly based on information and documents from the recent past. The F8, therefore, provides a snapshot of a particular time in your financial life. If you anticipate any changes in circumstances in the near future, such as a promotion, your children moving out of your home, a change in pension income, etc., this should be listed on page 3 of the F8.

Parts 5 and 6: Undue hardship and Income of Other Persons in the Household

These sections are relevant in very particular circumstances. If you are unsure of how to complete these sections and how they apply to your situation, you may wish to consult a lawyer.

Consequences of Insufficient, Dishonest, or Lack of Disclosure:

A Court has the discretion to set a party’s income for the purposes of calculating child and spousal support if they feel that insufficient disclosure has been made. If a Court imputes a party’s income in this manner, the result could be an order for a higher amount of support than what would have been made if the party had disclosed their income.

Lack of financial disclosure at the time of the creation of a separation, co-habitation, or marriage agreement is grounds to set these agreements aside. If your agreement regarding how to divide assets is set aside, the Court has the discretion to divide the family property between the parties according to the property and support regimes in the Divorce Act (Canada) and the Family Law Act. Full and honest disclosure is, therefore, key to creating an enforceable agreement.

Finally, inaccurate disclosure can increase your legal costs by dragging out negotiations and by requiring your lawyer to continuously clarify and revise your documents.

 

BRIEF ANSWER

In the absence of fraudulent or illegal conduct or conduct that is beyond the scope of the director’s authority, a director will not generally face personal liability. However, a director may be held personally liable if they fail to indicate that they are acting in their capacity as a director, breach their fiduciary duties, or fail to act in an objectively reasonable manner. A director may also face personal liability for any amounts owing to the government that the company has failed to pay for income tax, GST, Employment Insurance or the Canada Pension Plan. A director may protect against personal liability by prudently fulfilling their obligations as a director and by ensuring that there are proper protections in place to minimize the risk of personal liability.

DISCUSSION

In general, a company will shield a director from personal liability while they are acting as a director, provided that they are not acting fraudulently or illegally. However, there are certain circumstances in which a director will face personal liability.

A director owes a duty of care to the company by virtue of their position. The applicable standard of care is set out in the Business Corporations Act to be that of a reasonably prudent individual in comparable circumstances. Directors with special expertise or knowledge (such as a lawyer, accountant, etc.) will be held to a higher standard of care. A director may delegate responsibilities to others, such as an officer or an expert; however, the director remains responsible to ensure that the individual is competent and that they adequately perform their duties. A director who breaches their duty of care to the company may face personal liability for any loss that the company suffers as a result.

A director has a fiduciary duty to act honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the company. This requires the director to avoid the pursuit of personal gain where it is inconsistent with the best interests of the company, act selflessly and loyally as a director of the company, maintain the confidentiality of information acquired by virtue of their position, and avoid conflicts of interest or disclose conflicts in a timely manner. A conflict of interest may arise where a director has a material interest in a contract, decision, or transaction contemplated by the company, when a director enters into a contract that competes with the company, or when the director takes an opportunity that rightfully belongs to the company. A director who breaches their fiduciary duty to the company may face personal liability for any loss that the company suffers as a result of the breach.

A director may face personal liability if it is not clear to other parties that he or she is acting in their capacity as a director of the company. If third parties believe they are dealing with an individual and not a company, the director may face liability for any obligations or losses resulting from the transaction. A director will also be personally liable for their tortious conduct to third parties if the director is not acting within the scope of their authority or on behalf of the company. A director must act in accordance with the applicable statutes, regulations, memorandum and articles of the company. If they fail to do so and behave improperly, they may be held personally liable.

Although directors generally only owe a duty to the company, in certain cases courts have held directors personally liable for breaching a duty to creditors. For example, failing to act reasonably by preferring one creditor over another when the company was insolvent, or engaging in other conduct prohibited by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act may give rise to personal liability. A director may also be personally liable for oppression or unfairly prejudicial conduct towards certain stakeholders, such as shareholders. These parties have reasonable expectations that directors will fulfill their duties to the company fairly. Consequently, in certain circumstances, a director may be personally liable if, for example, they gained a personal benefit or increased their control of the company as a result of the oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct.

Statutory provisions may also impose personal liability on a director. For example, a director will face personal liability if they pay a dividend, purchases, or redeems shares in the company where the company is insolvent or the action would render it insolvent. Indemnifying another director or officer where indemnity is not permitted by the company’s articles, its memorandum, or by statute may also result in personal liability. Authorizing the making of a false or misleading statement can give rise to personal liability. Significantly, while a director is generally not liable for the misdeeds of other directors if a resolution that authorizes illegal or improper conduct is passed while the director is absent, that director must dissent in writing within seven days of learning of the prohibited act or they will face personal liability. If there is a causal connection between a director’s inaction and a loss suffered by the company, then the director may be held liable for the loss.

Where the director failed to exercise due diligence, depending on the nature of the business a number of other statutes may also impose liability. A director may face personal liability if a company fails to pay the Canada Revenue Agency for any amounts owing, including interest and penalties, GST remittances, failure to withhold and remit income tax, or failure to deduct and remit for employment insurance or the Canada Pension Plan. Liability for these amounts only attaches to a director who was acting as a director when these amounts became due and has acted as a director within the last two years. A director should also be aware of a company’s need to withhold income tax for employees claiming tax exemptions under the Indian Act for Indian property that is not actually situated on a reserve. A director may face personal liability for any amounts that the company failed to withhold and that the CRA has been unable to recover from the company. A director may be excused from personal liability if they can demonstrate that they acted reasonably and diligently in the circumstances by trying to resolve any of the business’ financial difficulties to assist with payment and by ultimately ensuring that the company pays any amounts owing.

Under the Employment Standards Act, each director of a company may be liable for up to two months of unpaid wages for each employee. However, a director will not be personally liable for termination pay, vacation pay that becomes due after the director has ceased to hold office, or for money that remains in an employee’s time bank after the director has ceased to hold office if the company is in receivership or pursuing bankruptcy proceedings. Directors may also be liable for injuries related to unsafe working conditions.

A director may face personal liability for failure to comply with environmental laws where they did not exercise due diligence to prevent this failure. In certain cases, where a company’s actions have resulted in contamination, directors have been found personally liable despite not being a director at the time the company caused the contamination.

A director may reduce the risk of personal liability by properly fulfilling his or her duties as director, by being familiar and ensuring compliance with the applicable statutes and the company’s articles and other governing documents, by carefully appointing and maintaining proper supervision over officers and experts, and by maintaining appropriate governance policies. A director may also reduce his or her personal liability risk by ensuring that there is adequate liability insurance in place for directors and that there is an indemnity agreement from the company to provide indemnity for personal liability, when appropriate, that occurs while performing directors’ duties.

SUMMARY

The company will generally protect a director from personal liability; however, there are certain circumstances in which a director will experience personal liability. In addition to personal liability for fraudulent or illegal conduct, a director may also face liability for failing to represent oneself as a director of the company or failing to act within the scope of their authority as director. A director must also ensure that he or she is familiar with any laws under the statutes that apply to the company, and that any obligations arising from income tax, GST, Employment Insurance, or the Canada Pension Plan are withheld and remitted. In order to avoid personal liability, a director must fulfill their obligations to the company by acting in the best interests of the company, by exercising reasonable care, diligence and skill, and by acting in accordance with the applicable statutes, regulations, and the memorandum and articles of the company.

 

When a home falls into foreclosure the property is sold to satisfy the owner’s creditors. The sale proceeds first go to the mortgagee, and then to other creditors in order of priority. Priority is generally determined based on various factors such as the type of creditor and the date of registration of the debt. In general, a judgment creditor cannot claim an interest in property beyond that held by the judgment debtor. The Court Order Enforcement Act (CEA) confirms this common law principle, and clarifies in s. 86(3)(a) that a judgment creditor’s interest is subject to any equitable interests that may have existed prior to the registration of the judgment.

In a recent decision, Chichak v Chichak, 2021 BCCA 286 the court had to determine priority between a judgment creditor with a registered judgment, and the unregistered equitable interest of a spouse.

In this case, Mr. Chichak was the sole registered owner of the property subject to a mortgage. Ms. Chichak had transferred her interest in title to him several years earlier. In 2014, Cardero Capital and First West Credit Union both obtained judgments against Mr. Chichak and registered them against the title of the property. The property was foreclosed and sold in 2016, and $312,830.83 of the sale proceeds remained after satisfying the debts owed to the highest ranking creditors. Cardero and First West applied to the courts for access to the remaining proceeds. At the same time, Ms. Chichak applied to have a 50% equitable interest in the property declared in her favour and argued that this interest should outrank the judgment creditors in priority. The chambers judge found in favour of Cardero and First West by applying the statutory presumption of indefeasibility (meaning the only valid interests in reference to the land are those that are registered against the title) and by looking at case law where transfers of title between family members had been considered gifts which extinguished the equitable interests of the giftor.

On appeal, the Court ruled that the chambers judge had mistakenly applied the principal of indefeasibility, stating that while a genuine purchaser for value would take priority over an unregistered equitable interest, a judgment creditor is not a genuine purchaser and therefore does not have the same priority. To allow the judgment creditors to take priority over the equitable interest would be to grant an interest in the property beyond what was held by the debtor, which would be contrary to the CEA. The Court allowed the appeal and sent the case back to the Supreme Court of B.C for redetermination.

Disclosure is a material issue in many family law cases. Without a clear idea of each party’s assets, a fair division of property is nearly impossible. However, there are clear limits to what the courts are willing to grant in an order for disclosure. In general, an applicant must specify which individual documents or category of documents they are requesting, link their request to a live issue in the proceedings, and justify the need for the disclosure of these documents (Mossey v. Argue, 2013 BCSC 2078).

In a recent case, Etemadi v Maali, 2021 BCSC 1003, one of the parties applied for an order to force disclosure of a hard drive. A hard drive was found to have the same legal status as a bookshelf or a filing cabinet; to grant an application for disclosure of a hard drive would amount to an authorization to search, which is not in keeping with the purpose of the disclosure rules. The court, therefore, declined to grant the order for production, stating that the interest of protecting privacy and privilege outweighed the desirability of absolute disclosure in this case.

 

There is often a delay between a lawyer completing a client’s will, and that client being available to execute (sign) it. The Covid-19 Pandemic has only lengthened these delays, which can be problematic if the will-maker happens to pass away prior to executing the new will.

The Wills, Estates, and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 (WESA) lays out the requirements for a valid will, including that the will must be duly executed by the will-maker. If a new will is found to be invalid, the pre-existing valid will governs the distribution of assets. However, s.58 of WESA provides that the court may choose to cure a formally invalid will. In order to use s.58, the court must first be satisfied that the will is authentic and that it represents the will-maker’s deliberate, fixed, and final intensions regarding the disposal of their property upon death.

In a recent case, Bishop Estate v. Sheardown, 2021 BCSC 1571, the will of 76-year-old Marilyn Bishop was brought before the court. A charity had been listed as a beneficiary in Ms. Bishop’s previous will made in 2014. In early 2020, Ms. Bishop instructed her lawyer to draft a new will that removed the charity and added new gifts to family members. Ms. Bishop had an appointment to execute the will on March 20, 2020. Unfortunately, Ms. Bishop was unable to meet in person with her lawyer due to the pandemic and passed away four months later without having executed her will.

The charity argued that Ms. Bishop’s failure to execute the will was evidence that she had changed her mind and that the new will did not represent her final intentions. The court rejected that argument, noting that Ms. Bishop had become closer to her family in the years leading up to her death thereby explaining the new gifts, that she had reviewed and filled in the blanks in the new will, and that Ms. Bishop’s failure to execute the will remotely was not evidence of a change of heart. Therefore, the court found that the new will satisfied the test in s.58 and ordered that it be fully effective.

If you have concerns about the validity of your will or other questions, please call Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

 

 

Custody and access to children are complex issues requiring consideration of which circumstances would best benefit the interests of the child. Often, one or both parents may desire a change in custody or access. This can be accommodated so long as they can prove that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last order was made.

A change can be said to be “material” if the situation presently in force would have resulted in a different order originally being made. Requests for variation are resolved entirely based on what will benefit the child, rather than what either of the parents want (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC)).

Variation is permitted under section 17 of the Divorce Act, which further stipulates that a parent’s newly developed terminal illness or critical condition qualifies as a change of circumstance. A child’s increased age and expressed wishes to spend less time with a parent can also constitute a material change ( M. (S.M.) v. H. (J.P.), 2016 BCCA 284). Intensified and more frequent conflict, if egregious enough, can also serve as a material change (Friedlander v. Claman, 2016 BCCA 434).

Section 47 of the Family Law Act also gives authority for a court to change an order of custody or access. Section 216 of the Family Law Act allows the court to address interim orders (K. (B.) v. B. (J.), 2015 BCSC 1481). Again, the parent desiring the order’s variation must prove a material change in circumstances. The change cannot be one that was contemplated and addressed in the prior order (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC)), such as a foreseen adjustment to a child’s extra-curricular soccer schedule. Material change can be shown through, for example, a parent becoming mentally ill, a child desiring to have less or more time with a parent, or a parent successfully completing counseling and improving their ability to be a guardian.

Although less frequently invoked, the court also has jurisdiction to change an interim order even if there has neither been a change in circumstances or new evidence. The court may only do so if a change would be in the best interests of the child (R. (R.) v. L. (S.), 2016 BCSC 1230. If you have concerns about your family matters, please contact Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

Through the Notice to Mediate (Family) Regulation, BC Reg 296/2007, a party to a family law proceeding may require the other spouse to participate in mediation with them. Mediation, if successful, can have many benefits including a shorter timeline, decreased cost, and lower conflict. It’s also much less formal than court, and private.

A notice to mediate can be served on the other party at any point that is 90 days’ time after the first response to the family claim is filed, and 90 days’ time before the date of the trial. The parties must agree on which mediator to select, and if they cannot, any party may apply to a roster organization that maintains a list of experienced mediators who would be sufficient. The roster organization will provide a list of options, and the Regulation then requires parties to eliminate certain mediators to which they object. The roster organization will make the final call on who the mediator will be, taking into account the parties’ indicated preferences, the mediator’s qualifications and fee, and scheduling availability.

The mediator is required to hold separate pre-mediation appointments with each party, where they’ll screen for potential power imbalance or abuse. If this appointment leads the mediator to believe that the process would be inappropriate or unproductive, they can conclude the mediation at that point and the parties will need to go through with litigation. Parties are not obligated to settle all or any of their issues at mediation but must attend and participate in good faith. Mediation requires parties to be reasonable, relatively calm, and open to negotiation. Considering how emotionally charged separation is for many individuals, mediation certainly isn’t the answer for everyone, but it may be worth an attempt.

 

Both the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act give authority to change the amount of spousal support that must be paid, and although worded differently, both acts require a change in circumstances before the variation is warranted. It’s important to bring the variation application under the Act which the support order was originally made under; the Family Law Act cannot be invoked to change a support order made under the Divorce Act (Malbon v. Malbon, 2017 BCCA 427), and vice versa.

The factors for the court to consider when asked to change spousal support are set out in section 17 (4.1) of the Divorce Act and Section 167 of the Family Law Act. In case law, a substantial change of circumstances has been constituted by multiple scenarios including:

• A change in income;
• A change in expenses;
• Retirement;
• Re-partnering; and
• A change of residence for the child.

If parties presume the payor’s income will somewhat fluctuate, but instead it increases significantly, the situation will likely meet the requirement of a substantial change in circumstances (Jennens v. Jennens, 2020 BCCA 59). Purposeful, voluntary changes made to one’s life, such as taking a larger mortgage for a shorter amortization, will not lead to a change of support (Poon v. Poon, 2005 BCCA 60).

A foundational principle of the spousal support obligation is that payor’s must compensate their spouses when that spouse’s contributions to the family allowed the payor to obtain the high income they later benefit from (Judd v. Judd, 2010 BCSC 153).

Voluntary retirement is typically more carefully analyzed by the courts than forced retirement. When considering if retirement justifies changing support obligations, the courts will look at age, background, employment opportunities, and the objectives of the support order (Brouwer v. Brouwer, 2019 BCSC 274). In Cramer v. Cramer, 2000 BCCA 272, the payor was forced to retire due to a health condition, the estate had been split equally originally, and the payee spouse had failed to follow through with educational plans that would have led to financial self-sufficiency. The payor’s retirement constituted a change in circumstances and the spousal support was terminated entirely.

Remarriage or re-partnering alone is not sufficient to trigger a material change in circumstances (Morigeau v. Moorey, 2013 BCSC 1923). But when combined with other factors such as an increase in the payee’s workplace earnings, the requirement can be met (Clarke v. Clarke, 2014 BCSC 824). A change in the children’s residence, meaning an increase in expenses for the parent who is primarily caring for them, can constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to vary spousal support (Aspe v. Aspe, 2010 BCCA 508). . If you’d like assistance with resolving any family matters, please contact Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

When relationships dissolve, parties often become concerned that their property will be disposed of or encumbered against their wishes. Property division will be addressed and ultimately resolved as separations move forward, but until agreements are finalized, it may be beneficial for spouses to take certain interim measures. The three types of entries often registered against the title of a property with the Land Title Office are:

• A certificate of pending litigation;
• A Land (Spouse Protection) Act entry; and
• A caveat.

While a certificate of pending litigation (“CPL”) does not create rights to the property which the party did not have before, it does provide notice to would-be creditors or buyers that an interest in the property is being claimed. This dissuades the vast majority of creditors or buyers, with the affect that the property is protected from disposition or encumbrance. The CPL is registered against the title of the property and can be filed against property owned by either or both spouses. A CPL may only be registered once the family law proceedings have begun.

If the property is held in the sole name of one spouse, the other spouse may make a Land (Spouse Protection) Act entry against it. Entries may not be made if the property is held in joint tenancy. The entry will prevent the property from being disposed of without consent. Entries can be made before court action has been commenced but must be made within one year of the spouses residing together in the home. The Land (Spouse Protection) Act has specific forms for the entry application and affidavit. Spouses must have been married or have been in a marriage-like relationship of at least two years.

Finally, if it’s not possible to apply for a CPL or Land (Spouse Protection) Act entry, a caveat may be used. A caveat is a temporary measure registered against the title of property owned by the other spouse. Caveats must be applied for through the correct form offered by the Land Title and Survey Authority, and lapse two months after their registration.
Not anyone can apply for the entries listed above; only people who are spouses or parties to the family law case may apply. If you have concerns about your property or family matters, please contact Heath Law LLP to book a consultation.

In Royal Pacific Real Estate Group Ltd. v. Dong, 2020 BCCA 323, the British Columbia Court of Appeal made it clear that unauthorized use of a trademark carries legal consequences. The Court found that the Defendant, Mr. Dong, had committed the tort of passing off, despite his arguments that he had proper consent from the Plaintiff, Royal Pacific Real Estate Group Ltd., to use the Royal Pacific trademark. Mr. Dong had signed an agreement with the Plaintiff whereby he would work under the real estate group as an independently contracted real estate representative. The agreement allowed and even encouraged Mr. Dong to use the Royal Pacific trademark in this capacity, because the group is well-known for success in the Vancouver area, having arranged billions of dollars of sales. But Mr. Dong could only properly use the trademark for his work under the real estate group; he was not authorized to use the trademark for his other private businesses. One of these included his business named Bliip Box, which he’d hoped to have as a supplier of real estate websites.

Mr. Dong took several actions which constituted trademark infringement including making available the contact information of the Royal Pacific group on his personal website, such that the public would consider Royal Pacific to be endorsing or associated with Mr. Dong’s personal site. The Defendant also sent solicitation emails to various real estate agents, saying that Royal Pacific was seeking to endorse local businesses through his personal Bliip Box company, while Royal Pacific had no intent of this. Even after Royal Pacific lawfully terminated their agreement with the Defendant, and as such he no longer had authority to use the trademark whatsoever, he continued to do so. Bliip Box continued to display Royal Pacific’s trademark, and in launching this business relied on the Royal Pacific online domain name. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgement that Mr. Dong had committed the tort of passing off outlined under section 7 of the Trademark Act. The Court recognized that the three elements of passing off were present, being: The existence of reputation or goodwill, a misrepresentation leading the public to believe an association between the parties, and damage or potential damage to the Plaintiff, as outlined in Vancouver Community College v. Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc., 2017 BCCA 41.

The goodwill associated with familiar trademarks has commercial value, and companies such as Royal Pacific will not stand silent in the face of passing off. The Defendant passing off his goods and services as being endorsed by and associated with the trademarked name can be viewed as the unauthorized use of goodwill, and wrongful confusion of the public. While the trial judge only awarded nominal damages of $6,000 to the Plaintiff, an injunction restraining Mr. Dong from continued trademark infringement was also granted. The Court held that the Plaintiffs underwent considerable inconvenience, but that Mr. Dong hadn’t financially benefited from his conduct.